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INDUSTRY TRENDS AND PRACTICES
The banking industry has become increasingly more complex in
recent years. Some of the reasons are the growing sophistication of
financial products such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and
credit derivatives, growing activities of banks across several legal and
regulatory systems in course of a general globalisation, growing
reliance on globally integrated IT-systems, and growing complexity
in organisation due to large-scale mergers or outsourcing of clearing
and settlement systems.
Operational risk is classified as “the risk of losses resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from
external events” (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2003a,b). Possible operational risk categories are (van den Brink,
2002):
1. human processing errors, for example, mishandling of software
applications, reports containing incomplete information, or pay-
ments made to incorrect parties without recovery;
2. human decision errors, for example, unnecessary rejection of a
profitable trade or wrong trading strategy due to incomplete
information;
3. (software or hardware) system errors, for example, data delivery
or data import is not executed and the software system performs
calculations and generates reports based on incomplete data;
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4. process design error, for example, workflows with ambiguously
defined process steps;
5. fraud and theft, for example, unauthorised actions or credit card
fraud;
6. external damages, for example, fire or earthquake.
Since the first consultative paper for the New Basel Accord on
Capital Adequacy had been issued by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision in 2001 (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2003b) for the current consultative papers), known as
Basel II, it is clear that regulators will demand banks to hold regu-
latory capital against operational risks.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed three
alternative approaches to operational risk measurement (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003b): The “Basic-Indicator
Approach (BIA)”, “The Standardised Approach (TSA)”, and the
“Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)”. In the BIAthe required
capital for operational risk is determined by multiplying a single
financial indicator, which is the average annual gross income over
the last three years, GI, by a fixed percentage (called the -factor). The
TSA differs from the latter in that banks are allowed to choose busi-
ness line specific weight factors, k, for the gross income indicator,
GIk, of the kth business line. The total regulatory capital charge, RC, is
the simple sum of the capital required per business line. Standard
business lines defined by the Committee are: (1) corporate finance,
(2) trading and sales, (3) retail banking, (4) commercial banking, (5)
payment and settlement, (6) agency services, (7) asset management,
and (8) retail brokerage. The factors loadings  and k lie between
12% and 18% (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003b).
Under the AMA, the regulatory capital requirement is set by the
bank’s internal quantitative and qualitative operational risk mea-
surement system, which is subject to supervisory approval. The
common scheme of the AMAhas been laid out by Georges, Frachot
and Roncalli (Georges et al, 2000). Within this scheme, banks
estimate – based on internal or external loss data basis or expert
knowledge – the mean and variation of annual frequencies and loss
severities for operational risk events per business line.
Based on this knowledge, distribution functions1 for the loss fre-
quency  N and loss severity X are parametrised from which Nik
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realisations are drawn in a Monte Carlo simulation for each busi-
ness unit i and for each operational risk category k. The loss in such
a sample is
(1)
Drawing a histogram of outcomes of Lik provides the loss distribu-
tion function per risk category/business line cell from which the
capital charge is read-off as the q-quantile. The required capital for
the bank as a whole can either be calculated as the simple summa-
tion of the capital charges across each of the risk category/business
line cell. Alternatively, the quantile can be determined from the his-
togram of the total loss,  This accounts for diversification
between the risk category/business line cells.
The Committee is not specifying the approach or distribution
function used to generate the operational risk measure for regula-
tory capital purposes provided that “fat tails” of the loss distribu-
tion are accounted for, and the adapted approach compares to the
internal ratings based approach for credit risk (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2003b). Supervisors further expect banks to
move along these approaches to operational risk as they develop
more sophisticated measurement systems and practices. However,
they permit banks to use AMAfor some parts of its operations and
BIA or TSA for other (“partial use”). The Committee further
requires that banks apply scenario analysis to assess the impact of
deviations from the parameter assumptions embedded in their
operational risk measurement framework, and “in particular, to
evaluate potential losses arising from multiple simultaneous oper-
ational risk loss event” (see paragraph 635 in Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2003b)).
The last requirement hints at the critical point of any AMA-
framework: the treatment of correlations between operational risk
events. Thinking of operational risk categories as “operational risk
processes” it is clear that there are functionally defined sequential
dependencies between individual processes, which all together bring
a big organisation to work. Consider the following example for
illustration: a system error leads to an incomplete data import into
a risk calculation engine, resulting in a wrong calculation of risk
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figures, and eventually to a human decision error by the trader, who
closes a possibly profitable position unnecessarily to reduce a risk
which in fact does not exist. Besides this there also exist “equal-time
correlations” between operational risk events. This is most obvious
in category 6 listed above.
Models which account for sequential and equal-time correlations
in operational risk events were first proposed by Kühn and Neu
(2003) and, later on, by Leippold and Vanini (2003). Similar
approaches have also been applied to credit risk modelling (Egloff,
Leippold and Vanini, 2003; Neu and Kühn, 2004). Our model is based
on analogies to models of interacting many particle systems in statis-
tical physics, in which phase transitions triggered by interactions can
occur and drastically change the overall behaviour of a system.
Specifically, our model resembles a lattice gas with heterogeneous,
functionally defined couplings – combined with an element of
annealed disorder concerning the role of loss-distributions. In such a
description, bursts and avalanches of process failures correspond to
droplet formation associated with a first-order phase transition.
In the following we summarise our main ideas (2003) and pre-
sent new simulations with particular focus on capital adequacy
and stress testing for operational risk. For further details and
analytic descriptions of our model we refer to Kühn and Neu
(2003).
FUNCTIONAL CORRELATION APPROACH FOR 
OPERATIONAL RISK
Our model to quantify operational risk is based on a topological
network of operational processes and activities in a bank. Core
processes such as trading and sales, risk management and risk con-
trol, financial control (P&L, management and financial accounting,
planning, budgeting), IT-and data-systems, back-office and settle-
ment/payment systems, retail and commercial banking, corporate
finance, asset management, etc, are represented as vertices in this
network. Bonds between these vertices designate mutual depen-
dencies between the core processes.
Such networks can be designed in hierarchical way: each core
process can be further detailed in subnetworks which show more
specific steps, for example a risk management function. Furthermore,
such a hierarchical network can be drawn for branches and
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subsidiaries. Examples have been presented by Van den Brink (2002)
and in the context of sequential correlations by Leippold and Vanini
(2003).
Such networks represent mutual dependencies between opera-
tional risk categories, business lines, branches and subsidiaries, and,
thereby, also provide a tool for capital allocation. Clearly, they are the
key for a successful implementation of the mathematical framework
proposed below. Defining a clearly laid-out and sufficiently detailed
topological process map is in our view a non-trivial and organisation-
specific task. Here we provide the mathematical framework for deriv-
ing the adequate capital for such a process network, and show how
well such networks allow for stress analysis of operational risks.
Mathematical framework
The occurrence of functionally defined sequential dependencies
between risk events in the case of operational risk is obvious.
Processes in organisation would normally be organised so as to
support each other. Thus, if a process fails, this will affect the work-
ings of other processes in adverse ways, if they rely on receiving
input or support of some sort from the failing process in question,
so that these other processes run a higher risk of failing as well. It
is therefore inadequate to model operational risk events individu-
ally. In the following we describe our extension of the common
AMA that takes the functionally defined sequential dependencies
between processes into account.
As an idealisation, we consider a simple two-state model here,
ie, a process can be either up and running or down. For the
process corresponding to the operational risk event i we designate
these states as ni  0 and ni  1, respectively. It will become obvi-
ous in what follows that generalisations that would include mod-
elling graded degradation of processes are easily formulated using
the principles laid out below. For the following, considerations
related to separation between business lines is immaterial, and we
will skip the business line index k, accordingly.
The interest is in obtaining reliable estimates of the statistics of
processes that are down at any time, and of the statistics of losses
that are thereby generated. As the loss severity incurred by a given
process going into the down state may vary randomly from event
to event, solving the latter problem requires convolving the
12-Kuhn.qxd  6/8/04  5:28 PM  Page 277OPERATIONAL RISK MODELLING AND ANALYSIS
278
statistics of down-events with the loss severity distribution related
to the process failures.
The reliability of individual processes will vary across the set of
processes, and so will the degree of functional interdependence.
These random heterogeneities constitute an element of frozen dis-
order, whereas the loss severities incurred by down processes con-
stitute an element of so-called annealed disorder as they are
(randomly) determined anew from their distribution each time a
process goes down. An appealing consequence of this analysis of
operational risks therefore is the independence of the dynamical
model of the interacting processes and the loss severity model (ie,
the estimate of the PDFs of loss severity incurred by individual
process failures). A commonly adopted assumption for the latter is
to take them as being distributed according to a lognormal distrib-
ution with suitable parameters for means and variances, which we
will choose in the following.
Dynamics
The formulation of the dynamics in the functional approach is
based on the observation that all processes need a certain amount
of support in order to maintain a functioning state for the time
increment t → t  t within the risk horizon, t  [0, T) (think of
energy, human resources, information, input from other processes,
etc). Here, only the generic features of the model shall be outlined.
Hence, the increment t is chosen such that all processes can fully
recover within this time interval, ie, the state ni of each process can
flip each time-step. For practical applications, one may decide to
model the recovery process more carefully: specific death period
after the failure of the ith process could be considered, and one
could differentiate between process failures being discovered and
adjusted up to a certain cut-off time, eg, end-of-day, at which a
process would have been completed (see van den Brink, 2002).
These features are not generic and can only be discussed related a
specific operational risk event under consideration.
Let hi(t) denote the total support received by process i at time t;
we choose it to take the form
(2) ht w nt t ii i j j i
j
() () () .   	 ∑
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It is composed of (i) the average total support i that would be
provided by a fully operational network of processes (in which
ni(t)  0 for all i). This quantity is (ii) reduced by support that is
missing because of failing processes which normally feed into the
process in question; (iii) lastly, there are fluctuations about the aver-
age which we take to be correlated Gaussian white noise with – by
proper renormalising i and wij – zero mean and unit variance.
Correlated Gaussian noise is introduced to model equal-time cross
correlations between operational risk categories in analogy to the
approach proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision for credit risk,
(3)
(4)
The Yk (t)  (0, 1) represent the common risk factors, whereas the

i(t)  (0, 1) are process-specific, idiosyncratic risk factors
describing fluctuations in the micro-state of each process. The
weights i  (i1,…,iK) stand for the sensitivity of the total sup-
port hi(t) received by process i to changes in kth common risk sec-
tor (common risk factors may be fluctuations in power supply,
frequency of spam or virus attacks, weather conditions affecting
human resources, etc). Without loss of generality we assume the
common risk sectors to be orthogonal, ie, the Yk(t) to have zero
correlation.2 Equal-time correlations are then given by
It is understood that the dynamics of some
common factors Yk (t) may be slow on the time scale set by t. Note
that non-linear effects could be included by modifying (2) to
.
Process i will fail in the next time instant t  t, if the total sup-
port for it falls below a critical threshold. By properly renormalis-
ing  i, we can choose this threshold to be zero, thus ( is the
step-function: (x)  1 for x  0 and 0 else)
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where 	i(t) is a zero mean, unit variance Gaussian white noise with
decomposition given in (3). The losses incurred by process i are
then updated according to
(6)
where  is randomly sampled from the loss severity distribu-
tion for process i. Note that the process dynamics is independent of
assumptions concerning their loss severity distributions within the
present model.
One can integrate over the distribution of idiosyncratic noises to
obtain the conditional probability for failure of process i given a
configuration n(t)  {ni(t)} of down-processes and a realisation of
the common factor Y(t) at time t,
(7)
Here, (x) denotes the cumulative normal distribution. Note that
up to the functional term “ ” this formula equals the con-
ditional default probability for credit defaults derived in the one-
factor Vasicek approach. This formalism is the methodological
basis for the Basel II capital charge for credit risk (see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003).
In (7) we have used the fact that i   1(PDi), where PDi,t is
the unconditional expected probability for process failures within
the time-increment t. This identity is obtained by setting nj(t)  0
for all j, and by integrating over the noise 	i(t) in (5).
The couplings wij can be determined by considering the transition
probabilities, PDij,t, for process i failure within the time-increments
t, given that in the configuration at time t process j is down,
(8)
This leads to
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Analogous identities would be available for determining higher
order connections wijk, if nonlinear effects were taken into account.
Probabilities for process failure only depend on the increment t
and not on the time t due to the stationarity of the dynamics. To
illustrate how these parameter are fixed in practice, consider the
following. Either from a historical loss database, or from an expert
assessment the following two questions must be answered per
operational risk category and business line:
1. What is the expected period,  , until process i fails for the first
time in a fully operative environment, and
2. given that only process j has failed, what is the expected
period, , for process i to fail also?
Noting that with Prob(failure at zt)  (1  PDi,t)z1PDi,t one
finds that
(10)
and analogously,
(11)
These identities express the PDi,t and PDij,t in terms of estimated
average times of failure, and are used to fix the model parameters
completely. Note that according to (8) PDij,t can be interpreted as a
non-equal time correlation for process failures.
The dynamics (5) resembles that of a lattice gas (on a graph
rather than on a lattice), the ni denoting occupancy of a vertex, the
wij interactions, and i taking the role of chemical potentials regu-
lating a priori occupancy of individual vertexes. The system is het-
erogeneous in that (i) the i vary from site to site, (ii) the couplings
wij have a functional rather than regular geometric dependence on
the indexes i and j designating the vertices of the graph. In the
physics context, one usually assumes noise sources other than
Gaussian so that cumulative probabilities are described by Fermi-
functions rather than cumulative normal distributions as above.
The quantitative difference is minute, however.
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The model dynamics as such cannot be solved analytically for a
general heterogeneous network. We shall resort to Monte Carlo
simulations to study its salient properties. As the presence of the
common factor expressed by the ik-term in Equation (3) would
influence only quantitative details of the system’s behaviour, we
will further present the analysis without correlation to the common
factors by setting ik  0.
Main features
The key features of the collective behaviour of networks of inter-
acting processes can easily be anticipated either directly from a dis-
cussion of the dynamic rules, or from the analogy with the physics
of lattice gasses.
In a network in which the unconditional probabilities for process
failures, PDi,t, are small, but process interdependence is large and
consequently conditional probabilities for process failures, PDij,t,
are sizable, spontaneous failure of individual processes may
induce subsequent failures of other processes with suficiently high
probability so as to trigger a breakdown of the whole network. If,
on the other hand, process interdependence remains below a criti-
cal threshold value, individual spontaneous failures will not have
such drastic consequences, and the whole network will remain in a
stable overall functioning state.
Of particular interest for the risk manager is the case, in which
process interdependence is low enough to make a self-generated
breakdown of the network extremely unlikely, but parameters are
nevertheless such that a stable overall functioning state of the
network coexists with a phase in which nearly the complete net-
work is in the down state (two-phase coexistence). In such a sit-
uation, it may be external strain which can induce a transition
from a stably functional situation to overall breakdown.
Analogous mechanisms are believed to be responsible for occa-
sional catastrophic breakdowns in bistable ecosystems (Scheffer
et al, 2001).
With increasing unconditional probabilities for process failures
it becomes meaningless to distinguish between an overall func-
tioning and a non-functioning phase of the network. The two-
phase coexistence ceases to exist – as in (lattice) gases – at a critical
point.
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SIMULATIONS
In the following we illustrate the validity of our intuitions about
global network behaviour using Monte Carlo simulations.
Monte Carlo dynamics can either be performed as parallel
dynamics (all ni are at each time-step simultaneously updated
according to (5) or (7)), or as (random) sequential dynamics (only a
single ni is (randomly) selected for update according to (5) in any
given time-step, in which case the time increment must scale with
the number N of processes in the net as t  N1).
For the analysis of operational risks, losses are accumulated dur-
ing a Monte Carlo simulation of the process dynamics over the risk
horizon, T. Runs over many risk horizons then allow to measure
loss distribution functions for individual processes within the
network of interacting processes, or of business units or the full
network by appropriate summations.
In what follows, we are not looking at a specific organisation,
but rather choose a random setting to illustrate the generic features
of our model. That is, unconditional failure probabilities are taken
to be homogeneously distributed in the interval [0, pmax] and we
determine random conditional failure probabilities as PDij,t 
PDi,t(1 
 ij), with 
ij homogeneously distributed in [0, 
max] which
fixes the ratio (PDij,t/PDi,t)max.
Going concern analysis
Figure 1 shows a situation where a functional network coexists
with a situation in which the network is completely down, and
parameters are such that spontaneous transitions between the
phases are not observed during a simulation.
The loss distribution for the functional network is unimodal with
a bulk of small losses and a fat tail of extreme losses, which are dri-
ven by the loss severity distribution.
By increasing the functional interdependence at unaltered
unconditional failure probabilities, the functioning state of the
network becomes unstable as shown in Figure 2. A spontaneous
transition into the ‘down’ state is observed during a single run of
50,000 Monte Carlo steps (note that a time-step can for many oper-
ational risk categories be associated with a day; though the
system appears to be stable over a very long time span, it is, in fact
not). Two interesting features about this transition to complete
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breakdown deserve mention: (i) the time to breakdown can vary
within very wide limits (not shown here), (ii) there are no
detectable precursors to the transition; it occurs due to large spon-
taneous fluctuations carrying the system over a barrier, in analogy
to droplet formation associated with first order phase transitions.
We should like to emphasise that realistically the system dynam-
ics after an overall breakdown of a process network would no
longer be the spontaneous internal network dynamics: recovery
efforts would be started, increasing support for each process by a
sufficient amount such as to reinitialise the network in working
order.
Stress analysis
One of the critical lessons for risk control from our analysis is the
possible metastability of networks of interacting processes: the
organisation would not necessarily realise the potential of big
losses due to bursts and avalanches of process failures, as there are
no detectable precursors to such transitions. With a basically
unchanged process setup the network could collapse and cause
significant losses, either due to external strain or rare fluctuations
of internal dynamics. Owing to the stability of the metastable
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Figure 1  Loss record for a system of N50 interacting processes with (first panel) 
pmax0.025 and (PDij,t/PDi,t)max1.6. For identical system parameters, the  
low-loss situation coexists with a high-loss situation (shown in the right panel:  
losses are elevated at all times as witnessed by the lower bound of the loss record  
in the right panel). Although a spontaneous total breakdown of the operational  
system (left) into the non-operational high-loss phase (right) does not occur during  
the simulation, external influences may well induce such a transition
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states, the bank will then have to spend a lot of efforts in order to
bring the network back to a functional state, which will cause addi-
tional costs. To assess the metastability, one will have to perform
stress tests. Indeed, the suitability for stress tests is one of the main
virtues of the present model.
Figure 3 illustrates the results of a stress simulation. In each case,
the system, if in the operational state, is repeatedly put under exter-
nal strain by turning off five randomly selected functioning
processes every 1,000th time-step, and letting the system evolve
under its internal dynamics thereafter. Such a disturbance can either
trigger a breakdown of the system or not. In the former case, if the
system is found fully down 1,000 time-steps later, it is reinitialised in
the fully operational state and once more disturbed 1,000 steps later.
One observes that the operational low-loss phase is resilient
against disturbances of the kind described above when
(PDij,t/PDi,t)max  1.7, although the low-cost phase coexists with a
phase of catastrophic breakdown, whereas at (PDij,t/PDi,t)max 
1.8 external strain occasionally succeeds to trigger breakdown of
the net; on the other hand, at (PDij,t/PDi,t)max  1.8 breakdown
under external strain of the given strength is the typical response of
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
Time
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
L
o
s
s
e
s
Figure 2  Loss record in a system with the same unconditional  
default probabilities as in Figure 1, but (PDij,t/PDi,t)max increased 
to 1.8. A spontaneous breakdown of the system is observed after 
about 27,000 time steps
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the system (with a few exceptions and occasional spontaneous
recoveries).
Such a stress analysis would also provide a tool to deal with
errors in the parameter estimation.
Capital adequacy and capital allocation
Of interest to the risk manager in the end are the total losses accu-
mulated over a risk horizon, T,
(12)
more specifically, the corresponding probability density function.
Figure 4 presents such distribution of accumulated losses for a net-
work that remains operational throughout the simulation. For this
simulation we took T  365t. The loss distribution has an
LT L T i
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Figure 3  Stress simulations described in the main text. The parameters are 
pmax0.025 as in the previous  gures and (clockwise) (PDij,t/PDi,t)max1.7, 
1.72, 1.8
12-Kuhn.qxd  6/8/04  5:28 PM  Page 286ADEQUATE CAPITAL AND STRESS TESTING FOR OPERATIONAL RISKS
287
extended tail (barely visible on the scale of the data), with a 99.5%
quantile at 3.07  104 and the largest aggregated loss observed dur-
ing the simulation over a time span of T at 2.5  105, ie, more than
an order of magnitude larger than the expected loss for the chosen
risk horizon T in the present case. A scatter-plot also shown in the
figure reveals that it is the spread in the loss-severity distributions
which is primarily responsible for the extended tail of the loss
distribution.
The histogram reveals the adequate capital to be allocated to the
process map underlying the simulation. Possible risk measures are
the q-quantile (in excess of the expected loss, if this is accounted for
elsewhere) or the expected shortfall. By repeating the simulations
for different process maps of different business lines, branches or
subsidiaries, the bank can decide which capital amount is best allo-
cated to these sub-units.
CONCLUSION
We have described how ideas from physics of collective phenom-
ena and phase transitions can naturally be applied to modelling
operational risk in financial institutions, or indeed any other form
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Figure 4  Scatter-plot of number of risk-events during a risk horizon of T365t 
vs. total amount of incurred losses (left panel); loss distribution (right panel). Total 
time covered was 104 T. The histogram is not normalised. Parameters of the system 
are N50, pmax0.025, and (PDij,t/PDi,t)max1.6, loss severity distributions are 
taken as lognormal, with means randomly spread over an interval [0,100] and 
volatilities chosen randomly as a factor of their respective means, the maximum 
factor being 0.1
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of organisation. Our main point was that functional dependencies
between mutually supportive processes give rise to non-trivial
temporal correlation, which can lead to the occurrence of collective
risk events in the form of bursts, avalanches and crashes. For risks
associated to process failure (operational risks) a functional depen-
dence seems to be the appropriate way for modelling sequential
correlations.
We have shown how the adequate capital for operational risk
can be calculated based on a dynamics which is defined on a topo-
logical process map. The key parameters of the dynamics, the
unconditional and conditional loss probability and the loss sever-
ity, can be obtained for realistic situations via expert assessment or
from loss databases. Defining these maps on different hierarchical
levels within an organisation allows for appropriate allocation of
capital to sub-units.
The critical lessons for risk control from our analysis is the pos-
sible metastability of networks of interacting processes: The organ-
isation would not necessarily realise the potential of big losses due
to bursts and avalanches of process failures, as there are no
detectable precursors to such transitions. With a basically
unchanged process set-up the network could collapse and cause
significant losses, either due to external strain or rare fluctuations
of internal dynamics. To assess the metastability, one will have to
perform stress tests. Indeed, the suitability for stress tests is one of
the main virtues of the present model.
1 Popular choices for the loss severity distribution functions are the lognormal, gamma, beta,
Weibull distribution. Common choices for the loss frequency distribution function are the
Poisson or negative binomial distribution.
2 This can always be assured by a simple rotation of common risk factors. The Yk(t) would
then be linear combinations of those assumed initially.
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